Archive — Artifact inheritance: the named successor to the Decision Bundle

Archive — not current documentation. Files in the last two groups describe the Seal family of research repositories or a past design state — they are kept for the record and are not claims about the Node CLI this repository ships.

Status: DECLARED, NOT BUILT. Ruling supplied in the work order: Ben, 2026-07-27 19:42.

This is a correspondence commitment, not a byte freeze. T1.1 and T1.2 remain UNFRISKED, so the successor’s shape, encoding, names, versions, compatibility surface, and even the final spelling of a successful result may change. What may not disappear silently is the checked chain. This document also does not choose between canonical binary product encoding and tested conformance; that is the separate Phase-2 fork in ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md.

Claims below are labelled:

• MEASURED means read in a cited source or implementation.
• INFERRED / DECLARED means a conclusion or the normative successor mapping established by this document. It is not implementation evidence.

1. What supersedes what

MEASURED. g9 names DecisionBundle { signed_config, A, H[], B, optional trace_witness } as the product artifact and requires an out-of-band TrustContext (seal-north-star-v2-g9.md §2). Its verifier also requires verifier_context_time and returns five disjoint typed outcomes (seal-north-star-v2-g9.md §3.1).

MEASURED. ApprovalRecordV2Payload binds an approval target, authorization time and expiry, nonce, session, exact request-subject digest/length/scope, exact shown-byte digest/length/type/encoding, renderer identity, approver, key identity, algorithm, and domain (/home/you/src/seal-host/rust/src/providers.rs:77). The implementation canonicalizes and domain-separates the signed payload (/home/you/src/seal-host/rust/src/providers.rs:314) and verifies the key identity, canonical payload, and Ed25519 signature (/home/you/src/seal-host/rust/src/providers.rs:759).

MEASURED. That payload does not contain g9’s signed configuration, requester statement, approval constraints, deployment identifier, config reference, adapter profile, receipt-issuer decision attestation, role-split trust context, history anchor, or verifier result. The current authorization decision writer emits a separate v2 host record and retains some signed config, request, audit, approval, and kernel-identity material (/home/you/src/seal-host/rust/src/authorization_decision.rs:198), but it is not the four-leg v3 record and not the g9 verifier. The four-leg v3 specification is explicitly unsigned and was specified as not implemented (AUTHORIZATION-RECORD.md:3, AUTHORIZATION-RECORD.md:426).

INFERRED / DECLARED. The named successor is the Authorization Decision Evidence Package v1, abbreviated ADEP-v1. ADEP-v1 supersedes the Decision Bundle as the named product container, not by renaming it and not by weakening its checked chain. It is a not-yet-built superset of the on-disk ApprovalRecordV2, with these logical homes:

AuthorizationDecisionEvidencePackageV1
  authorization_decision
  approval_records_v2[]
  checked_evidence
    configuration
    request_attestation
    approval_attestations[]
    decision_attestation
    history_anchor
    optional_trace_witness
  trust_context_ref
  verifier_profile

TrustContext remains a mandatory independently obtained verifier input; it is not made trustworthy by embedding it in ADEP-v1. The logical layout above names ownership only. It does not prescribe JSON, DSSE, canonical binary encoding, field spelling, byte layout, or compatibility machinery.

INFERRED / DECLARED. ApprovalRecordV2 is therefore partly built, while ADEP-v1 is not built. ApprovalRecordV2 occupies only approval_records_v2[]. It does not, by itself, supersede A, H, B, CFG, the TrustContext, or the verifier. A complete approval correspondence also needs checked_evidence.approval_attestations[], because the current v2 approval payload does not carry all of H’s context and constraints. A complete decision correspondence needs checked_evidence.decision_attestation; an unsigned authorization-decision record alone cannot replace B.

2. Correspondence matrix

MEASURED. The left-hand correspondences are the re-derivations and fail-closed comparisons stated in g9 §§2–3. The §3.2 gate list is expanded where one printed line checks several distinct byte links.

INFERRED / DECLARED. Successor home is the required ADEP-v1 logical home. Relation concerns recoverable information, not identical bytes:

• BIJECTION: the g9 information and check result must be recoverable in both directions.
• EMBEDDING: all g9 information must be recoverable, and ADEP-v1 carries additional information.
• NARROWED: strictly less g9 information survives.
• DROPPED: no successor home carries it.

Evidence reports evidence for the complete successor correspondence, not merely evidence that the g9 source specified it. UNVERIFIED means the named home or full check was not found on disk. It must not be read as green.

Bundle element	What it bound	Successor home	Relation	Evidence
S01 — Decision Bundle container (g9 §2)	CFG, A, H[], B, optional trace witness, and the requirement for independent trust travel together as one product artifact	ADEP-v1 root; checked_evidence; authorization_decision; approval_records_v2[]; out-of-band TrustContext	EMBEDDING	UNVERIFIED
S02 — config_ref (g9 §§2.0, 2.5)	Exact decoded CFG payload bytes to one domain-separated configuration identity	checked_evidence.configuration.content_ref	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S03 — trust_root_ref (g9 §2.0)	CFG to the pinned POLICY threshold set, with the verifier re-deriving the set digest	checked_evidence.configuration.policy_root_set_ref and verifier re-derivation	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S04 — delegation_ref (g9 §2.5)	Signed capability fields, parent linkage, and slot-specific role resolution	checked_evidence.configuration.delegations[] and verifier delegation resolver	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S05 — judged_request_sha256 (g9 §2.1)	A’s exact judged_request_bytes to its recomputed SHA-256	checked_evidence.request_attestation.subject_bytes plus subject, and authorization_decision.judged.subject	EMBEDDING	UNVERIFIED
S06 — raw kernel output/verdict (g9 §2.3)	Exact output bytes to the verdict read at the pinned offset	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.kernel_output and verifier offset check	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S07 — logical_time (g9 §2.3)	The exact issuer-asserted time supplied to the kernel and framed into its input	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.logical_time	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S08 — durability_class (g9 §§2.0, 2.3)	One issuer-asserted durability value to v1 eligibility and the honest durability label	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.durability	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S09 — operation_id (g9 §2.3)	ALLOW deduplication to (deployment_id, session_id, operation_id)	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.operation_id plus its link to authorization_decision.dispatch_attempted.attempt_id	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S10 — DSSE byte classes (g9 §2.4)	Signatures to authenticated PAE bytes, refs to decoded payload bytes, and key selection away from unauthenticated keyid hints	checked_evidence.*.authentication_boundary and verifier envelope handling	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S11 — hashed-input rule (g9 §2.5)	Every re-derived hash to a pinned formula, differential vectors, and independent-implementation agreement	verifier_profile.derivations and the shipped conformance corpus	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
S12 — event ceiling (g9 §§2.3, 3.3)	B to DECIDED plus intent to record, never RELEASED or EXECUTED	checked_evidence.decision_attestation plus the four separate authorization_decision legs	EMBEDDING	UNVERIFIED
G01 — CODE ROOTS PINNED (g9 §3.2)	Kernel, parser, and release-projection targets to the CODE threshold in the independent TrustContext	out-of-band TrustContext.code_plane and verifier gate G01	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G02 — POLICY ROOTS PINNED (g9 §3.2)	Roots, limits, revocations, identity, and config authority to the POLICY threshold	out-of-band TrustContext.policy_plane and verifier gate G02	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G03 — ROLE KEYS DISJOINT (g9 §3.2)	Full CODE and POLICY root/recovery/rotation closure to disjoint canonical Ed25519 key material	TrustContext pin validation and verifier gate G03	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G04 — TRUST CONTEXT BOUND (g9 §§3.1a, 3.2)	CODE plane, POLICY plane, and shared freshness window to one re-derived anti-splice reference	trust_context_ref, both signed planes, and verifier gate G04	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G05 — CONTEXT FRESH (g9 §§3.1a-ii, 3.2)	Context validity to independently classified verifier time, with substitution remaining not evaluable	out-of-band verifier-time input and verifier gate G05	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G06 — KERNEL PINNED (g9 §§3.1e, 3.2)	Decision replay to a CODE-allowlisted kernel digest and eligible kernel profile	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.kernel_identity, TrustContext CODE registry, and verifier gate G06	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G07 — Ρ DIGEST REGISTERED (g9 §3.2)	Issuer-selected release projection to a retained CODE registry entry	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.release_projection, TrustContext CODE registry, and verifier gate G07	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G08 — CONFIG CURRENT (g9 §3.2)	CFG window, rollback floor, revocation view, and receipt-key delegation epoch to verifier context time	checked_evidence.configuration, POLICY registry, and verifier gate G08	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G09 — ROLE KEYS DISTINCT + DELEGATION AUDIENCE (g9 §§2.6, 3.2)	Requester, approver, receipt issuer, and config authority to distinct capabilities whose contexts fit their audiences and lineage	checked_evidence.configuration.delegations[] and verifier gate G09	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G10 — ISSUER AUTHENTICATED UNDER POLICY ROOT (g9 §3.2)	B’s signer to a current receipt-issuer delegation chained to the pinned POLICY root	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.issuer and verifier gate G10	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G11 — REQUEST SIGNATURE VERIFIED (g9 §§2.1, 3.2)	A’s authenticated PAE bytes to the accepted requester capability	checked_evidence.request_attestation and verifier gate G11	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G12 — APPROVAL SIGNATURE VERIFIED (g9 §§2.2, 3.2)	Each H’s exact target/request, constraints, time, nonce, authority, and context to an accepted approver capability	paired approval_records_v2[] and checked_evidence.approval_attestations[], verifier gate G12	EMBEDDING	UNVERIFIED
G13 — REQUEST_BYTES_MATCH_REF (g9 §3.2)	Embedded exact request payload bytes to B’s request reference	checked_evidence.request_attestation.payload_bytes plus content_ref and the decision-attestation request link	EMBEDDING	UNVERIFIED
G14 — APPROVAL_BYTES_MATCH_REF[] (g9 §3.2)	Every exact approval payload to its reference, sorted order, cardinality, and duplicate rejection	checked_evidence.approval_attestations[] plus decision-attestation approval links	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G15 — CONFIG_BYTES_MATCH_REF (g9 §3.2)	Embedded exact CFG payload to B’s configuration reference	checked_evidence.configuration plus the decision-attestation configuration link	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G16 — PROFILE IDENTIFIER IN CONFIG SET (g9 §3.2)	Adapter-profile identifier to the CFG set bucketed by parser-derived kernel tool namespace	request/approval/decision context, configuration profile set, and verifier gate G16	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G17 — CONTEXT EQUAL (g9 §§2.6, 3.2)	Deployment, session, config, and adapter context to equality across A, every H, and B	all checked-evidence attestations and verifier gate G17	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G18 — CONTEXT MATCHES PIN (g9 §3.2)	Bundle deployment identity to the relying party’s out-of-band expected deployment identity	TrustContext identity pin and verifier gate G18	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G19 — PATH V1-ELIGIBLE (g9 §§2.0, 3.2)	Kernel-derived admission path and asserted durability to the closed or nonce-burn v1 floor	configuration admission table, decision durability, and verifier gate G19	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G20 — ADMISSION PROFILE DERIVED (g9 §§3.1f, 3.2)	Verification-profile identifier to the total, fail-safe admission lookup keyed by kernel tool namespace	configuration admission table, parser result, and verifier gate G20	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G21 — STEP_INPUT ≡ FRAME(A, H[], CONFIG, TIME) (g9 §§3.1c, 3.2)	Kernel input bytes to the rebuilt universal frame over every verdict-influencing artifact	checked_evidence.decision_attestation.step_input and verifier gate G21	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G22 — LIMITS DIGEST MATCHES TRUST CONTEXT (g9 §3.2)	B’s verification-profile definition digest to exact POLICY-registry limits octets	decision verification profile, TrustContext POLICY registry, and verifier gate G22	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G23 — PREVIOUS_RECEIPT_REF RESOLVES (g9 §§2.5, 3.2)	A supplied history edge to exact prior decision bytes, with standalone verification restricted to genesis	checked_evidence.history_anchor and verifier gate G23	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED
G24 — DECISION CONSISTENT (g9 §§3.1e, 3.2)	Allowlisted-kernel replay over the byte-equal frame to the recorded verdict, after all applicable gates pass	verifier typed result and checked transcript	BIJECTION	UNVERIFIED

Relation defence

INFERRED / DECLARED. The five EMBEDDING rows add information without discarding the g9 content:

• S01 adds a separately named authorization-decision event record and ApprovalRecordV2 components to the checked evidence.
• S05 and G13 add subject length, scope, and encoding to the exact request commitment.
• S12 expands the old event ceiling into explicit JUDGED, AUTHORIZED, DISPATCH ATTEMPTED, and ACKNOWLEDGED slots while retaining the old DECIDED/recording ceiling.
• G12 adds the exact shown bytes and renderer identity from ApprovalRecordV2; the paired approval attestation must still retain every H context, constraint, and authority binding.

INFERRED / DECLARED. Every BIJECTION row requires the same logical information and the same pass/fail/not-evaluable distinction to be recoverable in both directions. This does not require old field names or old bytes. No row is classified NARROWED or DROPPED. That is a specification statement only: because all complete rows are UNVERIFIED, none is claimed implemented.

3. Verifier I/O and typed outcomes

MEASURED. g9’s logical input type is:

verify(
  DecisionBundle,
  TrustContext,
  VerifierContextTime
) -> VerificationResult

TrustContext contains the out-of-band deployment identity pin; CLI --audit-unpinned selects a degraded audit mode. VerifierContextTime declares either an independent-clock trust class or the root-asserted substitution class. Each fail-closed gate is tri-state: GREEN, RED, or NOT-EVALUABLE (seal-north-star-v2-g9.md §3.1a-ii).

INFERRED / DECLARED. The successor input type replaces only the first parameter:

verify(
  AuthorizationDecisionEvidencePackageV1,
  TrustContext,
  VerifierContextTime
) -> VerificationResult

The output remains a sum type consisting of one typed status and exit code, the gate transcript, and the tiered always-on limitation lines. Consumers may authorize only the typed success case, never a matched line or numeric band. T1.2 may later rename or narrow the success claim, but it may not collapse a degraded or failed case into success.

MEASURED. The complete g9 outcome set and precedence are REFUTED(30) > UNVERIFIABLE(20) > STALE-UNKNOWN(11) > UNPINNED-AUDIT(10) > AUTHORIZED(0) (seal-north-star-v2-g9.md §3.1a-ii).

Typed outcome	g9 meaning	Implementation on disk	Evidence
AUTHORIZED (0)	Every mode-applicable gate green and freshness evaluated green under an independent clock	UNVERIFIED — no ADEP-v1/g9 implementation located	ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md:96
UNPINNED-AUDIT (10)	Explicit unpinned audit; identity-pin gate not evaluable; grants nothing	UNVERIFIED — no ADEP-v1/g9 implementation located	ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md:96
STALE-UNKNOWN (11)	Substitution time makes freshness not evaluable; never authorization	UNVERIFIED — no ADEP-v1/g9 implementation located	ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md:96
UNVERIFIABLE (20)	A required check cannot be evaluated, including absent root/pin, invalid schema, extraction failure, or unknown digest	UNVERIFIED — no ADEP-v1/g9 implementation located	ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md:96
REFUTED (30)	At least one fail-closed gate is positively red; degraded modes cannot mask it	UNVERIFIED — no ADEP-v1/g9 implementation located	ROADMAP-KERNEL-OUTWARD.md:96

MEASURED. Related receipt verifiers do exist on disk, but they are not this implementation. For example, seal-check declares the distinct P-ENFORCE set {authorised, authorised-unparseable, unpinned, failure} mapped to exits 0/4/3/1 (/home/you/src/seal-check/receipt.js:17). Neither matching exit zero nor the word “authorised” makes that verifier an implementation of g9’s different input type, gates, and five-case result.

4. What is not inherited, and why

INFERRED / DECLARED. There are no NARROWED or DROPPED rows to justify. The checked chain is carried as a specification obligation. An absent implementation is recorded as UNVERIFIED, not laundered into either an implemented inheritance or a deliberate drop.

The following are intentionally not inherited because they are outside the correspondence commitment, not because a matrix row was weakened:

• byte layout, JSON/DSSE use, field spelling, object boundaries, version numbers, and compatibility strategy;
• the name Decision Bundle as the product container;
• a decision on canonical binary product encoding versus tested conformance;
• an assumption that current ApprovalRecordV2 covers H in full;
• an assumption that the unsigned authorization-decision record authenticates B’s issuer or outer composition;
• an assumption that the five g9 verifier outcomes already exist merely because other verifier profiles return superficially similar words or exit codes; and
• a freeze of the AUTHORIZED label before T1.2 is frisked.

If a future change proposes to remove any S- or G-row, that row must become NARROWED or DROPPED here and use exactly one of these reasons: superseded by a stronger check (named), the claim was never earned, deliberately out of scope now (with ruler and time), or UNKNOWN — needs Ben.

Disagreements and limits

MEASURED. The brief is correct that ApprovalRecordV2 is the strongest signed successor component currently on disk. It is not the only related artifact: an authorization-decision v2 writer also exists (/home/you/src/seal-host/rust/src/authorization_decision.rs:60). That writer does not change the conclusion because it is neither the four-leg v3 record nor ADEP-v1.

MEASURED. The required sources do not contain Ben’s 2026-07-27 19:42 inheritance ruling. Its wording and timestamp are therefore work-order inputs, not independently measured repository facts.

MEASURED. g9 §2 shows a two-argument shorthand verify(DecisionBundle, TrustContext), while g9 §3.1 gives the operative three-input form including verifier_context_time. This document uses the later, fuller verifier signature.

INFERRED / DECLARED. No other disagreement with the work order was found.

Evidence: RUN inherit-2026-07-27